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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BANK OF VERNAL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Defenda;nt, 
P. H. LO"\V~E, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
':--ALBORG B. T. LOWE, 
Appellant. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case Nos. 
7794 and 7795 
This is an action brought by the Bank of Vernal to 
quiet title to certain land (Tr. 1) in which the defendant, 
P. H. Lowe, set up the defense of the statute of limita-
tions and cross complained for the quieting of title in 
himself on the grounds of adverse possession ( Tr. 40). 
FACTS 
The land in litigation is located about 4 miles east 
of Roosevelt, Utah, and consists of a string of four 40-
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acre tracts running south from Highway 40, marked on 
Exhibit 2 as tracts A, B, C, and D. It is bottom land 
('Tr. 64, line 13) and adjoins, along its eastern edge, the 
home ranch of the defendant, P. H. Lowe and his sister, 
Val borg Lowe (Tr. 60, line 8). The four forty's in dis-
pute had been in possession of the Lowes since about 
1919 (Tr. 142, line 26). Miss Valborg Lowe owned the 
four forty's but mortgaged them to Herron (Tr. 84, line 
18), who purchased them on mortgage foreclosure in 
1932 (Abstract of Title, Exhibit A, entry 18). 
In 1933 and 1934 Miss V alborg Lowe had a lease 
with an option to buy the land in dispute from Herron 
(Tr. 139, line 24). Herron mortgaged the land to the 
Bank of Vernal (Abstract of Title_, Exhibit A, entry 
23), and the mortgage was foreclosed by the Bank in 1939 
(Abstract of Title, Exhibit A, entry 27), and in the same 
year the land was bought by the Bank on mortgage fore-
closure for One ($1.00) Dollar (same exhibit and entry). 
The water to irrigate having been lost in 1935, and 
there being no other water since ( Tr. 122, line 12), the 
land in dispute was used by P. H. Lowe for pasturage 
from 1934 to the time of trial (Tr. 64, line 7). He was 
on the land "pretty near every day" (Tr. 64, line 15) and 
sa'v it every day (Tr. 66, line 11). No one else has been 
on it nor plowed it (Tr. 66, line 26). He used it all the 
time (Tr. 67,-line 13) for grazing cattle, sheep, and horse~ 
(Tr. 67, line 28). He put sheep on the disputed tracts in 
the 1nornings and took the1n back to the home ranch at 
night (Tr. 69). 
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The tracts in dispute are fenced. The north forty, 
tract ~-\., is wholly enclosed 'vith a woven and barbed wire 
fence ( Tr. 61). The same is true of the next forty, · B 
(Tr. 62). Tracts C and D, the south two forty's are 
enclosed together, being separated from tract B by a 
wove~ 'vire fence (Tr. 62, line 16), from the land on the 
west by a barbed wire fence (Tr. 62, line 25; Tr. 63, line 
6), from the land on the south by a barbed 'Y.ire fenc~ 
(Tr. 63, line 10), and from the land on the east by a three-
strand barbed wire fence a1.ong the ·east side from the 
. . 
cross fence between tracts B and C down along tract D 
(Tr. 168, line 17). 
There are no entrances in the fences on . the· north, 
west, o:t- south sides .of the four forty's, but the only en-
trances are from . the east, where these tracts join the 
Lowe property ( Tr. 62, 63). 
There have been fences around the land in dispute 
from 1934 (Tr. 64, lines 1 to 3), but those there at that 
time had to be rebuilt (Tr. 122, lines 1 to 6). The present 
fences are tight (Tr. 63, line 30),- being in part woven 
wire supplemented with barbed wire and in part just two-
and three-strand barbed wire (Tr. 61, 62, and 63). It 
was testified th~t $650.00 was spent on these fences since 
1940 (Tr. 179, lines 22 to 29).-
The four forty's were generally recognized, even 
at the time of trial, as belonging to Miss Valborg Lowe, 
or to her and her brother, the two appellants here (Tr. 
131, lines 6 to 9). 
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The land in litigation is bottom land (Tr. 60, line 11), 
extends south from Highway 40 (Tr. 60, line 27, to Tr. 
61, line 2), and can be seen from the highway (Tr. 67, 
lines 5 to 8). 
In the twelve years between the purchase of this land 
on mortgage foreclosure until the date of trial, no taxes 
were paid by the plaintiff, Bank of Vernal (S~ipulation, 
Tr. 57, line 12, Tr. 58, line 24, to Tr. 59, line 5 ). 
The defendant, P. H. Lowe, purchased the tax title 
to the. property in 1945 (Abstract of Title, Exhibit 1, 
entry 28) and paid all the taxes thereafter to and includ-
ing 1951, the taxes for 1946 and 194 7 being paid in 1948, 
and the 1948 taxes, in 1950, and the taxes for 1949, 1950, 
and 1951, before delinquency (Stipulation, Tr. 57, lines 
3 to 12; Tr. 58, line 24, to Tr. 59, line 5). 
No taxes were legally assessed between 1928 and 
1946, both inclusive, due to the failure to attach the re-
quired auditor's affidavit, none being attached prior to 
1947 (Stipulation, Tr. 56, line· 20, to Tr. 57, line 1, and 
Tr. 58, line 25, et seq.). 
Even as to the taxes assessed for 1947 (paid in 1948 
by P. H. Lowe), the auditor's affidavit required by Sec-
tions 80-7-9 to be affixed, and the one required by 80-8-
7 to be attached, to the roll were only placed within a 
loose-leaf binder along with the assessment sheets (Tr. 
177, lines 15 to 26). 
The Bank of Vernal bought the land for One ($1.00) 
Dollar on foreclosure (Abstract of Title, Exhibit 1, 
entries 27 and 32), failed to pay any taxes in the 12 years 
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it has held the land, and did not even record its deed 
until eight years after the sale (Abstract of Title, Exhibit 
1, entry 32). 
The Bank of \ 7 ernal ha~ never been in possssion of 
the disputed land at any time, although the cashier 
elai1ned that he 'vas on the land once in the ·'early spring·" 
of 1940 ( Tr. 1 ±S, line 2±). 
The action was eon1n1enced June 3, 1948. Summons 
·was served on the defendant County (Tr. 4) and defend-
ant, P. H. Lo"~e, on July 7, 1948. (Tr. 5 ). These were the 
only persons on whom process was served. A trial was 
had :Jiarch 26, 1951 (Tr. 27). A motion to permit the 
filing of an · Amended Answer and to reopen the trial 
·was granted (Tr. -±2). When the case was tried October 
15, 1951, a motion to strike the record of the previous 
testimony (Tr. 28 to 37) was granted (Tr. 50). The trial 
was had (Tr. 53 to 192); a decision in favor of the Bank 
of ·v .. ernal and against the defendant, .P. H. Lowe, was 
entere~ (Tr. 195); an~ a decree quieting title to the land 
in dispute in the Bank was signed and filed, subject to 
the payment to defendant, P ~ H. Lowe, of $378.9'6 to 
reimburse him for that amount paid to the 9ounty for a 
t~.x ?eed and for tax redemption and: taxes and the fur-
ther sum of $400.00 for improvement~ made. 
The decree quieted title in favor· of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants, and also against Miss Valborg 
Lowe (Tr. 202), an4 was not a party to the. action. Both 
she and her brother, P. H. Lowe, fil~.d separate appeals 
(Tr. 204, 205), but for the purpose of the hearing the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
appeals were consolidated by order of this court. With 
the permission of the court, because the facts are identi-
cal in the two appeals, this brief will present the argu-
ment of both appellants in order to save expense. 
Let us first consider the appellant P. H. Lowe's 
affirmative defense of title by 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
What is adverse possession? The statutory declara-
tions on the subject are these : 
"Where it appears that there has been an ac-
tual continued occupation of land under claim of 
title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded 
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, 
the land so actually occupied, and no other, is 
deemed to have been held adversely." (Session 
Laws of Utah, 1951, Section 104-12-10, Ch. 58, 
p. 183.) 
"For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession by a person claiming title, not founded 
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree 
land is deemed to have been possessed and occu-
pied in the following cases only : 
" ( 1) Where it has been protected by a sub-
stantial inclosure. 
"(2) Where it has been usually cultivated 
or improved. 
"(3) Where labor or money has been ex-
pended upon dams, canals, embankments, aque-
ducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating 
such lands arnounting to the sum of $5 per acre." 
(Session Laws of Utah, Section 104-12-11, Ch. 58, 
p. 183.) 
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... In no case shall adverse possession be con-
sidered established under the provisions of any 
section of this code, unless it shall be shown that 
the land has been occupied and claimed for the 
period of seven years continuously, and that the 
party, his predecessors and grantors have paid 
all taxes \vhich have been levied and assessed 
upon such land according to law." (Session Lav.rs 
of lT ta.h, Section 104-12-12, Ch. 58, p. 183.) 
1 Am. Jur. 793 states: 
•· In order to bar the true owner of land fron1 
recovering it from an occupant in adverse pos-
session and claiming ownership through the oper-
ation of the Statute of Limitations, the possession 
1nust have been for the whole period prescribed by 
the statute, actual, open, visible, notorious, con-
tinuous and hostile to the true owner's title and 
to the world at large." 
Does the defendant, P. H. Lowe, come within this 
rule of law~ 
SUBSTANTIAL ENCLOSURE, 11\IPROVEMENTS 
The land was fenced with a tight barbed and woven 
wire fence ( Tr. 61, 62, 63, and 168, line 17), in which there 
were no gates except those opening on the Lowe prop-
erty (Tr. 62 and 63). According to the lower court's 
finding, numbered "2," (Tr .. 200) the defendant, P. H. 
Lowe, had expended $400.00 in maintenance of the prop-
erty (Lowe testified it was $650.00), so that it has been 
"protected by a sub~tantial inclosure" as required by 
104-12-11(1), and it has been "improved" as required by 
104-12-11 (2). 
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ACTUAL, CONTINUAL USE 
There was continual use by Defendant Lowe of the 
land is dispute since 1934. Some sheep and cattle were 
left there to pasture every day (Tr. 74, line 1, et seq.; 
line 21). All the sheep were pastured there more or less 
all the time (Tr. 75, line 21, et seq.). There were about 
300 sheep (Tr. 76, line 15), and sometimes there were 
just a few pastured there and, at other times, all of them 
(Tr. 76, line 20). And a few of the cattle were pastured 
there (Tr. 76, line 25, et seq.). This has been true of 
all times since 1934 ( T.r. 7 4, line 1, et seq.; line 8 ; line 24; 
line 28; Tr. 75, line 16). So there was actual, continuous 
use. 
OPEN, VISIBLE USE 
The possession and use wa~ open and visible. It 
was not secretive but continued during the day time. It 
was used for pasturage (Tr. 64, lines 6 and 7) all the 
time (Tr. 67, line 13). Lowe would drive the sheep down 
in the morning ( Tr. -69, line 4) and leave them there all 
day (Tr. 69, line 7). Mostly, the sheep were brought back 
to the home corral every night (Tr. 69, lines 14 to 16). 
The tracts in question are in the creek bottoms and can 
be seen from U. S. Highway 40 (Tr. 60, line 27, to Tr. 61, 
line 2). So, clearly, the use was open and visible. 
It might be urged that there was no notice to the 
Bank of Vernal. It is doubtful, even though such were 
required, if it would be needed where there is so complete 
abandonment of the land as shown h.ere. There was no 
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actual or con~tructive pos~e~~ion by the Bank nor its pre-
dece~~or in interest, Herron, from.,~934 on. Neithe~· :Her-
ron, "~hose interests were ~or~closed in 1939, nor the 
Bank .of \~ernal ever sought to. enter on or take possession 
of the land or exercise any ownership or donlinion over 
it by .lease or ?therwise. An~ the Bank of Vernal, after 
the conten1ptuous purchase for One ($1.00) Dollar of 
credit on the judgment obtained on the Herron mort-
gage, not only did nothing about taking possession of the 
land, but paid no taxes and has not paid taxes to this day 
(Tr. 57, line 12; Tr. 58, ~ine 24, to- Tr. 59, line 5). And 
they did not even trouble to record their deed until eight 
years after the sale, when oil had -~ade this land valu-
able to the1n. No clearer case of abandonment could be 
found. 
However,.if it sho~d be u~ged that l:lOtice of adverse. 
claini should be given to the Bank m spite ~f such aban-
d.onment, this notice is generally only requisite where so 
required by statute. In any case where the use is open, 
-rl~ible, . arid notorious, tha~ is const;uctive notice and is 
sufficient (2 CJS 559). 
. . 
NOTORIOUS USE 
The claim of ownership 'by Lowe was well known 
according to Mr. Gardner, a neighbor. to the north ( Tr. 
131, lines 6 to 10), who says that people generally. thought 
the·. four 40's_ belonged to Miss: Valbor_g Lowe, the non-
party appellant, or to her and her brother, Defendant 
P. H. Lowe. So ·the use was notorious. There was no 
evidence to the contrary. 
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EXCLUSIVE USE 
No one else ever used the property. 
"Q. Has anyone had possession of it (the land 
inlitigation) other than you~, 
A. No." (Tr. 64, lines 18, 19). 
"Q. I asked you if anyone used this land besides 
you' 
A. No." (Tr. 77, line 10). 
"Q. Did you ever see anyone on the tracts A; B, 
C or D' 
: ' - : 
A .. See anyone what? 
Q. Using the tracts A, B, C, or D 1 
A. No. 
Q. Ever see anybody plow it1 · 
A. No. 
Q. Or run cattle or sheep on it~ 
MR. JOHNS-ON: We object. ... 
THE COURT: : .Be: sustained."- (Tr. 66, line 
23, et seq.) - · 
There· is rio evidence of anyone's using the land ex-
cept P. H. Lowe since 1934. A Mr. Seeley wanted the 
Lowes to stay off the land in dispute because he was buy-
ing the land from the County. They in turn told him to 
stay off (Tr. 127, liiles 7 to 15 ), and he kept off (Tr. 127, 
~~~e 30) 1 · Only f· :a. Lowe·has had P.ossession of this land 
(Tr. 77, line 10; Tr. 95, line 17). 
UNINTERRUPTED USE 
It might be urged that our use was interrupted in 
1940 because the Bank's cashier, in response to the ques-
tion, "Did you ever go upon the land during the year 
1940, the tracts marked 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D,' ~" answered, 
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h In .the early spring I did." ( Tr. 148, lines 22 to 24). 
But for "~hat purpose this "~as done does not appear. 
Nor does it appear that the entry was made for the- pur-
pose of taking possession, nor that possession was taken 
or attempted to be taken on that occasion. 
But merely \valking across a part or all of'.the land 
does not break the adverse possession. In Bingha.m 
L~very & Transfer Co. v. j;JcDonald (110 P. 56, 61; 37 
u. 45'7), after commenting on the adverse use of the lot 
by defendant, the court said: 
·~under these circumstances t.he occasional 
driving over the ground used as a yard by re-
.spondent in going to and ·coming from its barn 
was in no sense an interference with· appellant's 
. possession." 
So, clearly, the going on the land on the one occasion for 
an ·unkno\vn purpose could not be ·construed as an inter-
ference or interruption of the appellant P. H. Lowe's 
possession. Nor is there any evide.nce that the- bank, or 
its predecessors ·in· interest, at any time subsequent to 
1934, ever exercised or attempt~d to exercise·towa.rd the 
land in dispute any of the rights or attributes of posses-
sion. 
ADVERSE USE 
The use was adverse. 
hQ •. Have you since 1934 claimed to own this 
land~ 
. MR. JOHNSON: We object to that as not 
the best evidence. 
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THE C·OURT: Be overruled. He may an-
swer .... 
A. Yes." (Tr. 77, lines 12 to 28). 
He claimed the land from 1934 (Tr. 77, lines 12 to 
28). He used it continually from 1934, some of P. H. 
Lowe's cattle and sheep being on the land every day 
('Tr. 74, line 6, et seq., line 28, et seq.; Tr. 75, line 16). 
(There was sorne question raised as to whether the sheep 
belonged to hiffi or to his sister or to both, but as to the 
cattle no question was raised.) No one else had posses-
sion of the land (Tr. 64, lines ·18, 19; Tr. 77, line 10; Tr. 
95, line 17). No one has been on the land ( Tr. 66, lines 
23, et seq.) except possibly the cashier of the Bank of 
Vernal, who stated he was on it once in the early spring 
of 1940 (Tr. 148, lines 22 to 24) for an unknown purpose. 
Lowe stated, in answer to the inquiry as to when he 
started claiming it as his own, that it was after he bought 
it from the County (Tr. 93, lines 12 to 14) and then that, 
before he bought it from the County, he claimed to own it 
"in a 'vay" ( Tr. 93, line 18), and in explanation he said, 
''Well, oh never been any objections for clailning," (Tr. 
93, line 29) and, "Oh, I figured more or less right to it. 
Always had. Just as much as anyone else .... Nobody 
else took possession of it and make use of it. Nobody told 
me to stay off" (Tr. 95, lines 8 to 12). 
That is the testiinony as to intention, but his acts 
'vere unequivocal. He improved it "'·ith tight, barbed 
and woven wire fences (Tr. 61, 62), the north two forty's 
being each entirely enclosed, the south two being fenced 
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as a unit (Tr. 63), but all four being enclosed, with the 
only openings in the fences being located between the 
land in litigation and the Defendant Lowe's property 
(Tr. 62, 63). The sum of $400.00 was expended on im-
proving the land (Finding of Fact No.2), while the testi-
mony "\Vas that a total of $650.00 was spent in improving 
the fences (Tr. 179, line 22). 
In Toltec Ranch Company v. Babcock (66 P. 876, 24 
U. 1S3), the defendant and her predecessors in interest 
had been in possession of the property for twenty years 
or more and had cut hay and lived off the land. They had 
built a log cabin, a pole corral, and a cellar and had parti-
ally fenced the area. It had been known as the "Loveland 
Place" (previous name of defendant). Concerning this 
possession the court, after referring to the statute, said: 
"The land "\Vas occupied and used the same as 
other lands were in that neighborhood. The pos-
session,. as appears from the evidence, was open, 
notorious, uninterrupted, and peaceable, and un-
der a claim of right. It must, therefore, neces-
sarily be deemed to have been adverse to the 
holder of the legal title, and such long-continued 
possession may be deen1ed to have been adverse 
though not in its character hostile. 'Where one is 
shown to have been in possession of land for the 
period of limitation, apparently as owner, and 
such possession is not explained or otherwise ac-
counted for, it will be presumed to have been ad-
verse.' 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 889, 
890; 3 Washb. Real Prop. (4th Ed.) 159, par. 43. 
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The possession and occupancy, under the circum-
stances herein admitted and proved, were notice to 
all the world of the possessor's rights, and prim~ 
facie evidence of property, and of a seisin in 
fee; and, the longer the possession was continued 
undisturbed, the stro.uger becamt.. the conclusion 
that there was a legal origin for it. Busw. Lim. 
Sec. 2. 'Every possession is taken to be on the 
possessor's own title until the contrary· appears, 
as the possession is in itself the strongest evi-
dence of the claim of title, and, when long con-
tinued, of the title also.' Jackson v. Hillsborough 
Co1n'rs., 18 N. C. 177. In Patterson v. Reigle, 4 
Pa. 201, 45 Am. Dec. 684, on the question of ad-
verse possession, Mr. Chief Justice Gibson said: 
'There is a presumption, which lasts till it is re-
butted, that an intruder enters to hold for him-
self; and it is not to be doubted that a trespasser 
entering to gain a title, though conscious that he 
is a wrongdoer, will accomplish his object, if the 
owner do not enter or prosecute his claim within 
the prescribed period. But to do so it is necessary 
that his possession be adverse from the first, and 
to infer that he intended it to be otherwise would 
impute to him an inconsistency of purpose." (Ital-
ics added). 
The court then proceeds to quote fro1n the United 
States Supre1ne Court as follows: 
"Mr. Justice Baldwin, in Boone v. Chiles, 10 
Pet. 177, 223, 9 L. Ed. 388, 'speaking for the su-
preme court of the United States, said: 'The 
possession of land is notice of a claim to it by the 
possessor~ Sugd. Vend. 753. If not taken and held 
by contract or purchase, it is frorn its inception 
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adverse to all the world, and in twenty years bars 
the owner in law and equity.'" (Italics added). 
~\.ffirn1ed, Toltec 12. Babcock, 191 U. S. 542, 48 L. 
Ed. ~4, 24 S. Ct. 169. 
It might be urged that the case pf Pione,er Invest-
ment and Trust Co. v. Board of Education (99 P. 150, 
35 U 1) is applicable because of the statements made by 
P. H. Lo"~e, as above set out. It will be recalled that in 
the Pioneer ease the court, by way of dicta., said that pas-
~ive possession \vas insufficient grounds upon which to 
base adverse possession. Then the court there went on to 
say, "Whenever the possession is of such a character that 
ownership n1ay be inferred th~refrom, then the posses-
sion ordinarily may be presumed to be hostile to the 
rights of the true owner. . . ." 
In the case at bar the land was wholly enclosed \vith 
a tight barbed wire and a tight barbed and woven wire 
fence \vhich had no openings except into Defendant 
.Lowe's land. ·The land was constantly used by the De-
fendant Lowe and by him only, and such was open, un-
interrupted, notorious, exclusive, etc. Certainly such a 
possession is one opposed to that of the holder of the 
legal title. 
ILL WILL IS NO REQUISITE; 
CLAIM, IF OTHER THAN SUBORDINATE TO LEGAL 
OWNER, IS SUFFICIENT 
In 2 c·Js 570, it is said: 
"The term 'hostile,' as used in connection with 
the rule that possession requisite to a title by 
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liinitation must be hostile in character, does not 
import enmity or ill will, but rather imports that 
claimant is in possession as owner in contradis-
tinction to holding in recognition of, or in subor-
dination to, the true owner." 
In Davis v. Waggoner, 83 NE 381, 42 In~. A 115, the 
court said: 
','Every possession, then, is adverse and en-
titled to the peaceful and benignant operation and 
protecting safeguard of the statute, which is not 
in subservice to the title of another. . . ." 
Where the court upheld a claim of adverse posses-
sion, in Pacifiq Power & Light Co. v. Bailey, 295 P. 943, 
160 Wn 663, the court said: 
' ' 
" '.We have not overlooked the argument of 
the appellants that to constitute adverse posses-
sion the possession must have been hostile in its 
inception. . . . But the term 'hostile' as here used 
does not import enmity or ill will, but rather im-
pQrts that the claimant is in possession as owner, 
in contradistinction to holding in recognition of 
or subordination to the true owner~ 2 C.J. 122.' " 
The same court in Fisher and Hagstrom 214 P. 2d 
654, 35 Wn 2d 632 said on the same subject: 
"Appellants argue that there is no evidence 
of 'hostile intent' on the ·part of respondents. 
Apparently appellants have misconstrued the 
legal meaning of the term 'hostile intent' for, as 
we said in Young v. Newbro, Wash., 200 P. 2d 
97·5, the term 'hostile' does not import enmity or 
ill-will, but rather imports that the claimant is in 
possession as owner, in contradistinction to pos-
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session of real property in recognition of or sub-
ordination to the title of the true owner. See, 
also, Bowden-Gazzman Co. v. Hogan, 22 Wash. 
2d 27, 154 P. 2d 285, 289." 
See also Roesch vs. Gerst, 138 P. 2d 846, 851, 18 Wn. 
~ 
2d 294. 
The :Jfontana court recognized this doctrine in Price 
v. Western. Life ln.s'Uran.ce Co., 146 P. 2d 165, at 167, 115 
Mont. 509, 'vhere the court said: 
" 'Hostile" as used in the books in relation to 
the adverse possession of land does not mean, to 
use the language of distinguished counsel, that 
one 'must run off the legal owner from the land 
with a pitchfork,' but we think it necessarily 
must mean an invasion of the owner's possession 
by the claimant without the owner's- permission 
and in violation of the owner's right of property." 
In Cool v. Kelly, 80 NW 861, 78 Minn. 102, the sub-
ject was before' the court, and an adverse possession was 
upheld, the court saying in part: 
"If he took and held possession with the in-
tention of holding the tract for himself, to the ex-
clusion of all others, his possession was hostile 
and adverse. An adverse intent to oust the owner 
may be generally evidenced by the character of 
the possession and the acts of ownership of the 
occupant." 
The Michigan Court said there was a presun1ption 
of hostility under certain conditions in Green v. Angle-
mire, 43 NW 772, 774, 77 Mich. 168. 
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"When the possession is by actual occupation 
by the possessor, or his· tenants under claim of 
title, his possession is visible, open, notorious and 
distinct, and will be presumed to be hostile." 
The Nebraska court in passing on an adverse pos-
session case in Ballard v. Hansen, 51 NW 295, 33 Neb. 
86, referred to the Webster dictionary definition wherein 
the word ~'hostile" is associated with •'enemy," etc., and 
then said that such was not the import of the word in ad-
verse possession cases and explained the change thus 
(5i NW 295): 
"The word seems to have come into use in 
this connection at a time when the stat-qte of limit-
ations was looked on with disfavor, and the courts 
were disposed, if possible, to defeat all claims of 
the adverse clai~ant. At the present time the 
statute is viewed with favor as one of repose .... 
where such occupation has 'been adverse, open, 
notorious, and exclusive for the statutory period, 
that is sufficient. The word 'hostile' therefore 
does not correctly express the character of the 
occupancy required. . . ." 
A similar test of adverse use has been applied by 
the Utah court in some easement cases. In Zollinger v. 
Frank, 175 P.· 2d 714, 716, 110 U. 514, the court said: 
" ... That j·s, where a claimant has shown 
an open and continuous use of the land for the 
prescriptive period (20 years in Utah) the use will 
be presumed to have been against the owner and 
the owner of the servient estate to prevent the 
prescriptive easement from arising has the bur-
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den of showing that the use was wnder him instead 
of against him. This rule was mentioned in the 
recent case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. 
v. ~foyle, Utah, 159 P. 2d 596, (on rehearing) 174 
P. 2d 148, 155, where it was said: 'It is true that 
to establish an easement the use 1nust be notorious 
and continuous and on this adverseness-that is, 
holding against the O'\\'~er-will be presumed.' 
See also Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. Western 
Fuel Co., 13 Wash. 2d 75, 123 P. 2d 771 ; Eagle 
Rock Corporation v. Idamont Hotel Co., 59 Idaho 
413, 85 P. 2d 242; Fleming v. Howard, 150 Cal. 
28, 87 P. 908; Stetson v. Youngquist, 76 Mont~ 
600, 248 p. 196." 
There is no showing that the occupancy since 1934 
was under the Bank of Vernal, or its predecessor in in-
terest, Mr. Herron. No permission was ever sought or 
obtained. Both o'vners abandoned the property as worth-
less. The Bank of Vernal thought this land so worth-
less that it would not pay anything for the land and 
credited its judgment on tnortgage foreclosure in cause 
No. 1901 with only One ($1.00) Dollar for the land (Ab-
stract of Title, Exhibit 1, entry 27) and never paid a cent 
of taxes on the land from the foreclosure in 1939 to the 
day of trial (Stipulation, Tr. 57, lines 12, 29 and 30; Tr. 
58, lines 25 to 30; Tr. 59, lines 1 to 5). The Bank of Ver-
.. nal did not even record its deed until eight years after 
it bought the land (Abstract of Title, Exhibit 1, entry 
32). 
No evidence was introduced that the occupancy of 
Defendant Lowe was "under" the Bank of Vernal. In 
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view of the above authorities, such occupancy as has been 
shown here is hostile and adverse, as those words are de-
fined. · 
The Defendant Lowe has shown, without contradic-
tion, that his occupancy since 1934 was actual, open, 
apparent, notorious, uninterrupted, exclusive, and "hos-
tile," as that word is defined. 
The presumption ("If not taken and held by contract 
or purchase, it is fro1n its inception adverse to all the 
world. . . .") which this court announced in the T·oltec 
case, supra (66 P. 876, 24 U. 183), and again in the 
Bingham Liv-ery v. McDonald case, supra (110 P. 56, 37 
U. 457), is applicable to the case at bar. There is not 
a scintilla of evidence to the contrary. The only deduc-
tion possible is that the possession was adverse. 
PAYMENT OF TAXES 
There is one more element to be considered in the 
matter of adverse possession and that is .the payment of 
taxes required under Section 104-12-12. The requirement 
is for the payment of all taxes which have been assessed. 
This has been interpreted as meaning only those taxes 
which have been lawfully assessed. 
"If, however, no taxes were lawfully assessed 
or levied against the premises so claimed and 
occupied by them, they could acquire title by ad-
verse possession without payment of taxes." 
(Utah Copp~r Co. v. Chandler, 142 P. 1119, 45 lT. 
85.) 
What is the tax situation~ It was stipulated that 
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no taxes were legally assessed between 1928 and 1947 
(Tr. 56, line 20, to Tr. 57, line 1, and Tr. 58, line 25). 
Since no taxes \vere legally assessed between 1928 and 
19±7, any seven years bet,veen 1934 and 1947, '\vhen this 
court finds all of the elements for adverse possession 
were present, \vould be sufficient to sustain Lowe's 
claiin of title by adverse possession. We submit all of the 
elen1ents w·ere present in the years 1935 to 1941, inclu-
sive, and in each year after that to include the group 1940 
to 1946, inclusive. 
But, if for any reason it ~hould be necessary to look 
to the payment of taxes for 1947, there are these matters 
to consider: "\\Tffile the 1947 taxes were not paid until 
1948 (Stipulation, Tr. 57, line 4), all the taxes have been 
paid by the Defendant Lowe and none by the Bank of 
\Ternal on their One ($1.00) Dollar investment. But were 
the taxes, beginning even with 1947, legally assessed f 
The law requires that the auditor "attach" his affi-
davit under Section 80-8-7. Concerning not only the 
legality but the importance of attaching his affidavit, 
the court, in the case of Telonis v. Staley (144 P. 2d 513, 
517, 104 U. 537) said: 
'·. . . The property owner is entitled to rely 
on such verification and the treasurer is bound 
thereby and he is required to proceed to issue the 
tax notices in accordance therewith, and to collect 
the taxes based on the computations of the audi-
tor. The final affidavit of the auditor thus be-
comes highly in1portant, and in the absence of any 
curative provision in the statutes for failure of the 
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auditor to subscribe to and attach such .. certificate 
of authentication in affidavit form, the require-
ment of the stahJte must be observed." 
The affidavit for the 1947 tax roll was merely '~in­
~erted in this loose-leaf binder along with the asses~­
ment sh~ets" (Tr. 177, lines 17 and 18). Is this the at-
tachment required by statute1 If it can be attached by 
merely being placed in the binder with the assessment 
sheets, would it not also be attached by a paper clip? 
There is nothing permanent about either attachment. 
And the assessments could be changed as readily with 
one meth.od as with the other. There is no element of 
p~rmanency about a loose-leaf book. The pages can be 
substituted at will. That is the very purpose of using 
such a book. But if the affidavit must be attached to the 
tax roll it should be attached so that a ·substitution of 
assessment sheets cannot be made. If it is important that 
the roll carry the _imprint of the auditor's certificate of 
authenticity,. then should not these sheets be fastened to-
gether. to guarantee, in some manner, that they are the 
sheets which the auditor says contain the assessments 
and all subsequent changes 1 This could be done by at-
taching all sheets securely to his affidavit, as by binding 
or by running a ribbon or string through and attaching 
them to his affidavit with sealing wax, as has been done 
fo~ hundreds· of years, or by having the auditor's affi-
davit on each sheet if the 'loose-leaf method is to be used. 
As this court has said, this affidavit is "highly inl-
portant." It should be attached so that substitution can-
• ) • • .j ! . } ' ' . . :. ! • ; . • ! . : . ! ' . :· : ~ : . : . . ' . . . . 
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not be n1ade and ~o that those using and inspecting the 
roll \Vill kno\v that the affidavit applies to the sheet under 
consideration. The 19-!7 tax roll did not have the audi-
tor's affidavit attached as required. There was no tax 
legally assessed in 1947. So, even if it is necessary to 
include 1947 in the computation of the seven years, no 
legal assessment \vas n1ade and no taxes were required 
to be paid. 
Now, turning from our affirmative defense of ad-
verse possession, it is also our position that the Bank of 
\Ternal cannot recover because its right of action is bar-
red by the 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Sections 104-12-5 and 104-12-6 provide that no ac-
tion shall b~ commenced, etc., unless the moving party 
\vas seized or possessed of the land within seven years. 
MEANING OF "SEIZED" 
It is evident that neither the Bank of Vernal nor its 
predecessor was in possession of the land sought, within 
the requisite seven years or at all. Can the Bank escape 
the restriction by the claim that it was "seized" within 
seven years' That word has been accorded several mean-
ings, including that of a right to possession (see Black's 
Law Dictionary). But,' as the court stated in Ford v. 
Garner's .Adm. (49 Ala. 603), it has no accurate meaning 
(see also 57 CJ 100). If we accord it the meaning of right 
to possession, ho\Y will it \York out in the light of our 
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statutes~ Section 104-12-5 permits an action if the one 
bringing it has either been in possession for seven years 
or. (if we accord "seize" the meaning .of the right to pos-
session) has had within seven years the right to posses-
sion ·of: the property. Since the owner has the rigpt to 
possession until it is barred by the statute, this would 
result in a period of seven years after loss of possession 
and then a second period of seven years after the loss 
of the right to possession, or fourteen years within which 
an action might be brought. This would bring about a 
startling result in our limitations of. action, one quite 
foreign to the other limitations and to our practice. Has 
"seized" any definition more within reason? 
"Seizin in fact or in deed is actual posses-
sion," while seizin in law is "a bare right to pos-
sess or to occupy the land .... " (57 CJ 103). 
" 'Seizin' and 'possession,' as now understood, 
mean the same thing." (Savage v. Savage, 23 P. 
890, 891, 19 Ore. 112). Quoted with approval in 
; Carlson v. Sullivan, 146 F'ed. 476 at 478.) 
"Seizin and possession are treated as synony-
mous, meaning that possession which is held under 
. claim of title." (Woolfolk v. Buckner, 55 SW 168, 
9 ; 67 Ark. 411, 12.) 
·In Minnesota, where the statute of limitations "pro-
vides that no such action shall be brought unless the 
plaintiff, his ancestor,predecessor, or grantor was seized 
or possess.ed of the premises in question within 20 years 
before the commencement of the action," the. court stated: 
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~~The term 'seized' in the statute is not used in 
contradistinction to •possessed' so as to admit of 
an interpretation that the legal title or owner-
ship only 'vould be sufficient to prevent the stat-
ute running as against the true owner though a 
stranger be in the actual occupancy, pedis pos-
sessione, of the land in dispute. . . . There can be 
but one actual seizin, and this necessarily includes 
possession; and hence an actual possession in hos-
tility to the true O\vner works a disseizin, and if 
the disseizor is suffered to remain continually 
in possession· for the statutory period, the remedy 
of the former is extinguished. Melvin v. Propri-
etors, etc., 5 ~Ietcalf 33; Fowle v. Ayer, 8 NH 57; 
Sedg. & W., Title to Land, sec. 728, 737; Woods, 
Lim sec. 256" Seymour Sabin & Co. v. Carli, 16 
NW 495, 31 Minn. 81. 
That the word "seized" is used as opposed to dis-
seizin finds support in the Utah case of Hammond v. 
Johnson, 66 P. 2d 894, 94 U. 20. There the suit involved 
a claim of adverse possession of water. In the course of 
the opinion, the court quoted with approval from Words 
and Phrases (66 P. 2~ 898): 
"To constitute 'adverse possession' the pos-
session must be actual, for otherwise there is no 
disseizin, and the real owner remains in posses-
sion actually or constructively." 
It is submitted that the only way to escape the in-
equitable result of a 14-year statute of limitations in ad-
verse possession cases is to i~terpret "seized" as "seized 
in fact," or "seized" as contradistinguished from "dis-
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seized." Such an interpretation would avoid the double 
statutory period and accord with our practice and also 
with the authorities just cited. That is the meaning of 
"seized" as used in our statute. Such being the case, 
the fact that the Bank. of Vernal and its predecessor in 
interest were not seized nor possessed within the seven 
years of June 3, 1948, the action is barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
Let us turn to some of the cases on the subject. Our 
Section 104-12-5 and 104-12-6 are identical to Sections 
318 and 319 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 
The following are some of the cases. decided under the 
comparable sections of the California statutes. 
In Haney v. Kinevan, 166 P. 2nd 361, 73 Cal. A. 2d 
34H, the action was to quiet title. There the court said: 
"This is the sole question necessary for us to 
determine: 
"Were plaintiffs bar!ed by the provisions of 
section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure from 
maintaining the present action? 
"This question must be answered in the af-
. firmative and is governed by the following per-
tinent rules of law: 
"(1) An action for the recovery of rea] 
property cannot be maintained unless the person 
. asserting the cause of action or under whose title 
the action is prosecuted, or the ancestor, pre-
decessor or grantor of such person has been seized 
or possessed of the property in question \vithin 
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five years before the conunencen1ent of the action 
to enforce such right or claim. (Code of Civi] 
Procedure, section 318; Housing Authority· v. 
Pirrone, 65 Cal. App. 2d 566, 151 P. 22, and cases 
therein ri ted.) 
·· ( ~) An action to quiet title to real prop 
erty is an action for the recovery thereof within 
the meaning of section 318 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. (South Tule Independent Ditch Co. 
v. King, 1-!-! Cal. -!50, 453, 77 P. 1032; Townsend 
v. Driver. 3 Cal. App. 581, 583, 90 P. 1071.) 
~- (3) The burden of proof is upon plaintiffs 
to show that they or their ancestors, predecessors 
or the grantors of such persons have been seized 
or possessed of the property in question within 
five years before the commencement of the action. 
(Patchett v. Webber, 198 Cal. 440, 451, 245 P. 
422; ~r\.kley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625, 209 P. 576.) 
" ( 4) Where no evidence is introduced in 
support of an issue findings should be made there-
on against the party 'vho has the burden of proof. 
( 24 Cal. J ur. ( 1926) , p. 945, sec. 189.) 
"(5) Applying the foregoing rules to the 
facts in the instant case, since plaintiffs concede 
that there 'vas no evidence that they were in pos-
session of the disputed property within five years 
before 1\Iay 10, 1938, the date the present action 
was commenced, the trial court properly found 
as an ultimate fact 'That it is true that the cause 
of action set out in plaintiff's complaint is barred 
by the provisions of section 318 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure of the State of California.' " 
In Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670, 58 U. 418, 
this matter of the burden of proof arose. The owner 
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of the legal title sued one who claimed the property by 
adverse possession. The owne.r won in the lower court, 
and the adverse claimant appealed. Aft~r referring to 
what is now Sections 104-12-5 and 104-12-6 this court 
said that the burden of proof, when these sections are 
pleaded by way of defense, is upon the holder of the 
legal title. 
··we have purposefully indulged in consider-
able detail in stating respondents' position and the 
basis of their contention for the reason that, in 
view of the statutes quoted upon which appellants 
rely, it seems to the court that the burden rests 
upon the respondents to show why the statutes 
pleaded by appellants do not apply in the present 
case." 
In the case at bar, as in the Haney case, supra, there 
was no evide.nce that the holder of the legal title had been 
in possession within seven years; and, since the burden 
is upon the holder of the legal title to affirmatively es-
tablish possessi~n, the plaintiff~s action must fail. 
LIMITATIONS ARE INDEPENDENT OF ADVERSE 
'- POSSESSION 
There is a tendency to constru·e the seven-year stat-
ute of limitations as though it were merged in the provi-
sions relating to adverse possession and as ·though the 
seven-year prohibition had no application unle~s title by 
adverse possession could be proven. Of course, the two 
are different. For instance, in case of the removal of 
ore where no attempt is 1nade to claim by adverse pos-
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session, the seYen-year statute (104-12-G) \vould yet gov-
ern. Is it not possible that, \vhere there has been a dis-
seizen, the statute of lin1itations would apply even though 
all the required elen1ent~ of adverse possession 'vere not 
present 1 Such ha~ been held to be the case. 
In Cocking r. Fulwider, 273 Pac. 142, 95 Cal. A. 745, 
the action was brought to quiet title to a disputed boun-
dary strip. The court held that the action was barred 
because of Section 318, Code of Civil Procedure. 
'·. . . The evidence was that the respondents 
and their predecessors were in undisputed actual 
possession of the land for more than 30 years and 
that appellant had not made any claim of right or 
possession during that period except the ineffec-
tual attempt to fence t~e property. immediately 
prior to the commencement of the suit. The pur-
pose of the Code section is to prevent the prose-
cution- of stale demands such as we have here, 
and for this purpose it limits the remedy of the 
plaintiff, even though all the elements necessary 
to_ esta.blish_ adverse possession on defendant's 
part a.re not present. (Italics ours.) This distinc-
tion is emphasized in Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 
625, 647, 209 P. 576, and the rule of that case sup-
ports the conclusion of the trial court that appel-
lant may not maintain his action." 
In Fickeisen v. Peebler, 219 P. 2d 864, 98 Cal. A. 2d 
320, in 1926, a corporation, after its charter had been re-
voked, conveyed this land in litigation. For 18 years 
after that it was held by the grantee and its assigns. 
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Then an action was commenced by the trustee for the 
corporation to quiet title. The court refused to do· so, say-
ing on page 866 : 
"The finding that the action was barred under 
section 318, Code of Civil Procedure, is supported 
by evidence that Fickeisen, as trustee, or Grace-
land, was not seized or possessed of the property 
within five years immediately preceding the com-
mencement of the action. Cocking v. FUlwider, 95 
Cal. App. 7·45, 273 P. 142; Morrow v. Coast Land 
Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92, 111, 84 P. 2d 301; Earl 
v. Lofquist, 135 Cal. App. 373, 379, 27 P. 2d 416." 
In Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 84 P. 2nd 301, 29 Cal. 
A. 2d 92, the action was ·brought to quiet title to 480 acres 
of oil land on the north dome of Kettleman Hills. Entry 
was made by the plaintiffs under a claim for oil in 1909. 
They then contracted with Ochsner to drill wells on the 
. property. He did so in 1911; but thereafter, in 1920 "rhen 
a leasing act was passed by Congress, he took a lease 
in his own name which he assigned to the defendant com-
pany in 1924. c·oncerning the application of Section 318 
of the Code of Civil Procedure to this case, the court 
said: 
~'As the prospecting permit and the lease con-
stituted interests in real property adverse and 
hostile to the title of the members of the Morrow 
group, it follows that the action to recover an in-
terest in the Ian~ (if it be such) was barred in five 
years after the date ofthat permit or the date of 
the lease, assuming they (the Morrow group or its 
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successors) 'vere then in possession. Sec. 318, 
Code C~iv. Proc.; Earl v. Lofquist, 135 Cal. App. 
373, :?7 P. 2d 416; Cocking v. Fulwider, 95 Cal. 
App. 7 -±5, 273 P. 142." 
In Earl v. Lofquist, 27 P. 2d 416, 135 Cal. A. 373, 
the suit was for fraud of the directors whereby one of 
their number was let into possession of land. This action 
seeks to quiet title against the director. Concerning the 
matter, the court said : 
··The provisions of section 318 are pleaded by 
way of den1urrer to that portion of the amended 
complaint designated as the second cause of ac-
tion. . . . It affirmatively appearing from the 
amended complaint that respondent has been in 
possession of the property since the date of the 
transaction complained of, over eleven years be-
fore the action was commenced, the demurrer 
thereto was properly sustained on this ground." 
In Ho,using Authority v. Pirrone, 151 P. 2d 22, 65 
Cal. A. 2d 566, the action was brought to condemn prop-
erty, and an appeal was taken from the judgment of 
condemnation whereby the defendant, Cunningham, re-
ceived nothing by way of compensation. Concerning the 
matter of the statute of limitations, the court said: 
"Second: Was defendant barred by S.eetions 
318 and 319 of the Code of Civil Procedure from 
asserting any interest or claim in or to the prop-
erty described in the complaint' 
"This question must also be answered in the 
affirmative. The law is established in California 
that a cause of action arising out of the title to 
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real property, or to rents or profits of the same 
cannot be maintained unless the person asserting 
the cause of action or under whose title the action 
· is prosecuted, or the ancestor, predecessor or 
grantor of such person has been seized or pos-
sessed of the property in question within five 
years before the commencement of the action to 
enforce such right or claim. Sections 318 and 319 
of the Code of Civil Procedure; Akley v. Bassett, 
189 Cal. 625, 645, 209 P. 576; Morrow v. Coast 
Land Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92, 111, 84 P. 2d 301; 
Cocking v. Fulwider, 95 Cal. App. 745, 747, 273 P. 
142." 
During the oral argument in the lower court, 
the Judge asked the effect of ruling that the stat-
ute of limitations applied without having adverse pos-
session. This matter was discussed in the case of A.kley 
v. Bassett, in 209 P. 576, 189 Cal. 625, which was an ac-
tion for partition of certain lands. Concerning the mat-
ter here in issue, the court said: 
"The only provisions of the Code that seem to 
have any application to this phase of the case are 
· sections 318 and 319 of the Code of Civil Proced-
ure and section 1007 of the Civil Code. The two 
former prescribe seizing within a period of five 
years before the comme-ncement of the action as 
a necessary condition of the right to maintain the 
same. They affect only the remedy, i.e., the action, 
or means given by the law for the recovery of a 
right, but not the right itself." 
The same thing is true with reference to the statute 
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of limitations operating to bar an action on a note and 
n1ortgage. The action is barred, and yet the note and 
obligation to pay still re1nain, even though unenforceable. 
The note can be the consideration for a new pron1ise to 
pay, and the n1ortgagor 'vill find that he cannot reinove 
the cloud of the n1ortgage on his property. Coming to a 
quiet title action, even though the action is barred by the 
statute of limitations, unless the statute is plead, it is no 
bar. In other \vords, the title remains even though the 
remedy does not. 
Perhaps it would not be am1ss to quote again the 
Cocking case in 273 P. 142 and 143, where the court said: 
"The purpose of the Code section is to pre-
vent the prosecution of stale demands such as we 
have~ here, and for this purpose it limits the 
remedy of the plaintiff, even though all the ele-
ments necessary to establish adverse possession 
on defen.dant' s part are not present." (Italics 
ours.) 
'~The statute of limitations is now generally regarded 
as a statute of repose." (Frick J. in Gibson v. Jensen, 
158 P. 426, 428, 48 U. 244.) Certainly if Section 104-12-
5 is accorded any meaning, then the conclusion is un-
escapable that the plaintiff who sues for the recovery of 
land must have been in possession of the property within 
the period of ~rs before the commencement of the 
action. It is uncontroverted that the Bank of Vernal has 
never been in possesdion of this property at alL The stat-
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ute of limitations prevents it from recovering on its ac-
tion to quiet title, regardless of whether the defendant 
is entitled to recover on adverse possession or not. 
JUDGMENT AGAINS.T ONE, NOT A PARTY 
T~ere is one more element to be considered and that 
is the decree against appellant, Valborg B. T. Lowe. 
As pointed out above, she was not a party to the litiga- , 
tion at all. Her first "Appearance" was as a judgment 
· defendant. 
The case of Ho-user v. Smith, 56 P. 683, 19 U. 150, 
related to a proceeding wherein a juqgment was rendered 
against persons not. parties to the suit. Concerning this 
the court said (56 P. 685) : 
". . . The record presents a case where the 
judgment is shown to be absolutely void, and ren-
dered against persons who were not before the 
court, and over whom the court had no jurisdic-
tion. Courts have no right to dispose of and ad-
ju~icate upon the property rights of persons who 
are not parties to the case, and who are total 
strangers to the record. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, 
Section 16, 494; Mosby v. Gisborn, 54 Pac. 121, 
17 Utah ------·" 
Certainly there can be no question but that the judg-
ment herein should be reversed as to Volberg B. T. Lowe. 
It is submitted that it should also be reversed as to 
. ' P. H. Lowe because he has clearly established his right 
to title by adverse possession, and, even if he should fail 
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there, because the seven-year statute of litnitations barH 
this stale demand by the Bank of \' ernal. Both the Bank 
and its predecessor in interest, Mr. Herron, regarded the 
property as worthless. Fron1 1934 on, the property was 
left 'vithout any indicia of 0"\\,.nership exercised by either 
Herron or the Bank. Neither leased the property; neither 
farmed it or used it; neither took steps to keep up the 
fences; and neither paid any taxes on the property. The 
Bank regarded it as \vorthless and allowed a credit of 
only One ($1.00) Dollar on its judgment, so that it could 
reach some chattels. But the Bank never took possession 
of the land nor exercised any jurisdiction over it. The 
Bank did not even record its deed until eight years after 
it became the owner. The Bank is now seeking to en-
force a very, very stale demand, nine years after it 
"washed its hands" of the land. The Bank, activated by 
the desire to gain whatever wealth oil will bring to the 
owners of this land, now, after nine years of it~ own 
inaction and four years of its predecessor's seeks to take 
this 160 acres from the man who has struggled to eke 
out an existence on this land. Such stale demands are 
not favored. The decree should be reversed. 
IRWIN CLAWSON, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and AppeUwnts. 
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